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Abstract 
In recent years maritime joint development zones have emerged as an important means to overcome 
deadlock in relation to maritime jurisdictional claims. A key consideration in the negotiation and 
establishment of maritime joint development arrangements is the definition of the precise geographical 
area within which joint development is to proceed. This chapter reviews joint development practice with 
particular reference to the spatial definition of joint zones. 
This experience can be broadly divided into joint zones that have been agreed in addition to a maritime 
boundary line and those that have been defined in the absence of a boundary line, which have proved a 
more popular alternative. With respect to the latter type of joint zone, many such joint areas are 
determined by the limits of competing maritime claims and thus involve the joint development of disputed 
waters. 
The definition of joint zones in this manner is often a sensitive and challenging issue. This is the case 
because, without prejudice clauses notwithstanding, the use of unilateral maritime claims as the limits of 
a joint area to an extent validates such claims, giving them practical impact and thereby a degree of 
endorsement and legitimacy which they may not, in fact, warrant. This has led to reluctance on the part of 
some States to, in a sense, recognise and accept what are regarded as excessive claims through their use 
in the definition of the limits of a maritime joint development zone. This chapter explores past experience 
of how this delicate issue has been dealt with. Some observations drawn from this inventory and 
assessment of past practice are offered, together with some preliminary considerations on the 
applicability of these observations to overlapping claims in the South China Sea. 
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The paper reviews practice in terms of maritime joint development arrangements with 
particular reference to the spatial definition of the zone within which the cooperative 
regime will apply. This is frequently a critical consideration in facilitating agreement on 
joint development yet it is also a sensitive and potentially problematic one. The latter 
part of the paper provides some observations on key lessons learned together with 
preliminary thoughts on applicability to areas of overlapping maritime claims in the 






In recent years maritime joint development zones have emerged as an important means 
to overcome deadlock in relation to maritime jurisdictional claims. A key consideration 
in the negotiation and establishment of maritime joint development arrangements is the 
definition of the precise geographical area within which joint development is to proceed. 
This paper reviews joint development practice with particular reference to the spatial 
definition of joint zones.  
 
This experience can be can be broadly divided into joint zones which have been agreed 
in addition to a maritime boundary line, and those that have been defined in the 
absence of a boundary line, which have proved a more popular alternative. With respect 
to the latter type of joint zone, many such joint areas are determined by the limits of 
competing maritime claims and thus disputed waters.  
 
The definition of joint zones in this manner is often a sensitive and challenging issue. 
This is the case because, without prejudice clauses notwithstanding, the use of 
unilateral maritime claims as the limits of a joint area to an extent validates such claims, 
giving them practical impact and thereby a degree of endorsement and legitimacy which 
they may not, in fact warrant. This has led to reluctance on the part of some States to, in 
a sense, recognise and accept what are regarded as excessive claims through their use in 
the definition of a joint development zone. The paper explores past experience of how 
this delicate issue has been dealt with in the past. Some observations drawn from this 
inventory and assessment of past practice are offered, together with some preliminary 
consideration on the applicability of these considerations to overlapping claims in the 
South China Sea. 
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2. The Rationale for Joint Development 
 
Where overlapping claims exist and the parties have reached a deadlock in maritime 
boundary delimitation negotiations, the alternative of a shared rather than unilateral 
management regime may prove attractive. Although a number of these cooperative 
mechanisms predate the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (LOSC),1 such 
joint maritime zones have predominantly been concluded since the Convention was 
opened for signature. The key provisions within LOSC in this respect are Articles 74(3) 
and 83(3) which provide, in identical terms that: 
 
Pending agreement as provided for in paragraph 1, the States concerned, in a 
spirit of understanding and cooperation, shall make every effort to enter into 
provisional arrangements of a practical nature and, during this transitional 
period, not to jeopardize or hamper the reaching of the final agreement. Such 
arrangements shall be without prejudice to the final delimitation.2 
 
State practice in maritime joint development, reviewed below, can be broadly divided 
into joint zones which have been agreed in addition to a maritime boundary line, and 
those that have been defined in the absence of a boundary line, which have proved a 
more popular alternative. Six examples of joint zones concluded in conjunction with the 
delimitation of a maritime boundary line and sixteen where no boundary line has yet 




3. The Spatial Definition of Joint Development Zones4 
 
 
3.1 Joint development agreements in addition to a boundary line 
 
A number of joint zones have been defined in conjunction with the delimitation of a 
maritime boundary between the parties concerned. In these circumstances, the joint 
zone may act as a catalyst for reaching agreement on the delimitation line, for example 
providing both parties with some rights in the maritime area of interest and therefore 
countering the potential drawback of defining a boundary line and subsequently 
discovering that the bulk, or all, of the resources in the area subject to overlapping 
                                                          
1
  United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 397 (hereinafter 
LOSC). 
2
  LOSC, Articles 74(3) and 83(3). 
3
  Brief outlines of the key attributes of each of the maritime joint developments are provided here. 
Greater emphasis has, however, been devoted to those joint zones in the Asia-Pacific region, reflecting 
the focus of the present volume. It is worth noting that the joint development arrangements reviewed do 
not comprise an exhaustive list of all such mechanisms. For example, a number of joint arrangements 
that are now defunct, such as that which existed offshore the, now divided, Kuwait-Saudi Arabia 
Neutral Zone, are not considered here. 
4
  The review of joint development practice contained herein draws on the author’s earlier published 
work though with a spatial emphasis, notably, Schofield, C.H. (2009) ‘Blurring the Lines: Maritime 
Joint Development and the Cooperative Management of Ocean Resources’, Issues in Legal Scholarship, 
Berkeley Electronic Press, Vol.8, no.1 (Frontier Issues in Ocean Law: Marine Resources, Maritime 
Boundaries, and the Law of the Sea), Article 3. 
4 
 
maritime claims falls on the ‘wrong side of the line’ as it were. It can be observed that 




Signed in January 1958, this agreement represents the first maritime joint development 
agreement worldwide.5 In a sense it is not a joint zone at all in that it is wholly located 
on one side (Saudi Arabia’s) of the agreed boundary. This is in distinction to other joint 
zones defined in conjunction with maritime boundary agreements which tend to 
straddle the agreed line. The Bahrain-Saudi arrangement is, however, joint in the sense 
that the revenue derived from the oil resources exploited within the defined area are 
shared between the parties.6 The zone defined is hexagonal and encompasses the Fasht 
Abu-Sa’fah oilfield which had previously been contested between the parties.  
 
Argentina–Uruguay 
Argentina and Uruguay established a “common fishing zone” as well as a joint 
Administrative Commission in conjunction with the delimitation of their boundary in 
the estuary of the Rio de la Plata [River Plate] and seawards into the South Atlantic 
ocean.7 The common fishing zone is defined as the area seaward of the parties’ 12nm 
territorial sea limits. The outer limit of the joint area is expansive as it is described “by 
two arcs of circles with radii of 200 nautical miles whose centre points are, respectively, 
Punta del Este (Uruguay) and Punta del Cabo San Antonio (Argentina).”8 While being 
primarily concerned with fishing issues, the joint Administrative Commission is also 
tasked with promoting joint scientific research, particularly that relating to marine 
living resources and the prevention and elimination of pollution as well as aiding 
navigation.9  
 
Australia–Papua New Guinea 
Australia and Papua New Guinea (PNG) reached a particularly innovative agreement 
relating to the Torres Strait in 1978.10 The agreement delimits separate continental 
                                                          
5
  Bahrain- Saudi Arabia Boundary Agreement Dated 22 February 1959 (signed 22 February 1958, 
entered into force 26 February 1958). Treaty text available at 
<www.un.org/Depts/los/LEGISLATIONANDTREATIES/PDFFILES/TREATIES/BHR-
SAU1958BA.PDF>. See also, Charney, J.I. and Alexander, L.M. (1993) (eds.), International Maritime 
Boundaries, Vol.II (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff), 1489-1497. 
6
  The agreement provides that the exploitation of the oil resources in this area will be carried out in the 
way chosen by the King of Saudi Arabia “on the condition that he grants to the Kingdom of Bahrain 
one half of the net revenue accruing to the Government of Saudi Arabia and arising from this 
exploitation.” Ibid., Second Clause. 
7
  Agreement between the Government of Argentina and the Government of Urugay Relating to the 
Delimitation of the River Plate and the Maritime Boundary Between Argentina and Uruguay, (signed 
19 November 1973, entered into force 12 February 1974). Treaty text available at: 
<www.un.org/Depts/los/LEGISLATIONANDTREATIES/PDFFILES/TREATIES/URY-
ARG1973MB.PDF>. See also, Charney and Alexander, International Maritime Boundaries, Vol.II: 
757-766. 
8
  Ibid., Article 73. 
9
  Ibid., Article 66. 
10
  Treaty between Australia and the Independent State of Papua New Guinea concerning sovereignty and 
maritime boundaries in the area between the two countries, including the area known as Torres Strait, 
and related matters, 18 December 1978  (entry into force, 15 February 1985). Treaty text available at 
[1985] ATS 4 and 
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shelf and fisheries boundaries. This recognised the geographically complex character of 
the Torres Strait including numerous islands. Many of these islands, including ones in 
close proximity to the mainland coast of PNG are under Australian sovereignty. In order 
to achieve an equitable outcome, a continental shelf boundary was defined centrally in 
the Strait, midway between the mainland coasts of both States, while a fisheries 
boundary, passing close to the PNG coast, was defined around the Australian islands in 
the northern part of the Torres Strait. Thus, in this area PNG seabed underlies 
Australian water column. 
 
Rather than creating a joint development zone as such, the Torres Strait treaty instead 
established a broad protected zone encompassing the Torres Strait. The objective of the 
protected zone is to safeguard traditional fishing activities and the free movement of 
traditional inhabitants, to regulate commercial fisheries and to protect the marine 
environment. In keeping with these objectives a moratorium on oil and gas exploration 
within the protected zone was agreed. The Torres Strait Treaty provided for the 
establishment of a joint advisory council was set up to promote cooperation,11 and also 
provides a for detailed regulatory regime which is designed to protect traditional rights 
while promoting cooperative development of commercial fisheries.12  
 
Iceland–Norway (Jan Mayen Island) 
In 1980 Iceland and Norway reached agreement on a maritime boundary relating to the 
EEZ, to be based on 200nm arcs measured from basepoints on Iceland.13 In addition to 
the boundary line a joint zone was also be established. A particularly notable feature of 
this 45,470km² joint zone is that while in common with many other joint zones 
established in addition to a boundary line it straddles the agreed boundary, the Iceland-
Norway zone does so in uneven fashion.14 Overall, 61 per cent of the joint zone lies on 
the Norwegian side and 39 per cent on the Icelandic side of the boundary line. While 
each State is entitled to 25 per cent of revenues deriving from the exploitation of oil and 
gas on the other side of boundary,15 hydrocarbon fields straddling the joint zone and 
Icelandic waters are considered wholly Icelandic.16 This boundary agreement and joint 
zone were negotiated been the parties on the basis of the recommendations of a 
Conciliation Commission. The uneven distribution of the joint zone across the 
delimitation line, in favour of Iceland, took the disparities between Iceland and Jan 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
<www.un.org/Depts/los/LEGISLATIONANDTREATIES/PDFFILES/TREATIES/AUS-
PNG1978TS.PDF>. See also, Charney and Alexander, International Maritime Boundaries 929-975. 
11
  See, for example, Kaye, S.B. Australia’s Maritime Boundaries, 2
nd
 edition, Wollongong Papers on 
Maritime Policy, 12, (Wollongong: Centre for Maritime Policy, 2001): 104-105; and Renton, D. (1995) 
‘The Torres Strait Treaty after 15 Years: Some Observations from a Papua New Guinean Perspective’, 
pp.171-180 in Crawford, J.R. and Rothwell, D.R. (eds) The Law of the Sea in the Asian Pacific Region, 
Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff. 
12
  Article 23 of the treaty, revenues are split 75:25 according to whose jurisdictional sector of the zone the 
fish are caught in. 
13
  Agreement between Norway and Iceland on Fishery and Continental Shelf Questions, 28 May 1980 
(entered into force 13 June 1980). Treaty text available at 
<www.un.org/Depts/los/LEGISLATIONANDTREATIES/PDFFILES/TREATIES/isl-nor1980fcs.pdf>. 
14
  Agreement on the Continental Shelf between Iceland and Jan Mayen, 22 October 1981 (entered into 
force 2 June 1982). Treaty text available at 
<www.un.org/Depts/los/LEGISLATIONANDTREATIES/PDFFILES/TREATIES/ISL-
NOR1981CS.PDF>. See also, Charney and Alexander, 1993: 1755-1765. 
15
  Agreement on the Continental Shelf between Iceland and Jan Mayen, Articles 5 and 6. 
16
  Ibid., Article 8. 
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Mayen, particularly in terms of population, into account. Additionally, Iceland’s lack of 
mineral resources as compared with Norway was a factor in the recommendations of 
the Conciliation Commission.17 
 
Denmark–United Kingdom 
In May 1999 Denmark and the United Kingdom concluded a maritime boundary 
agreement for the area between the Faroe Islands and Scotland.18 While seabed and 
water column boundaries are coincident for most of the line, in the central part of the 
boundary a “Special Area” was defined, providing for joint fisheries jurisdiction. The 
Special Area covers an area of 2,337nm2 or approximately 8,000 km².19 The Special 
Zone straddles the continental shelf boundary but does so in unequal manner, the 
majority of it being located on the UK side of the seabed boundary line. This reflected 
the overwhelming dependence of the Faroe Islands economy on fisheries.20 Within the 
Special Zone each party has the right to continue to conduct fishery operations, 
including the issuing of licences, and the parties also agreed not to interdict fishing 
vessels operating in the joint zone under a licence issued by the other party.21 Denmark 
and UK also agreed to take “all possible steps to prevent and eliminate pollution” 
resulting from their offshore activities, including exploration activities related to seabed 




China and Vietnam concluded a maritime boundary agreement in the Gulf of Tonkin 
(Beibu Gulf to China and Bac Bo Gulf to Vietnam) in December 2000 and simultaneously 
created no less than three joint fishing zones.24 In conjunction with the boundary treaty 
was an Agreement on Fishery Cooperation in the Gulf of Tonkin was concluded. Through 
the fisheries cooperation agreement a joint Common Fishery Zone of  approximately 
30,000km² (around 8,747nm²) was defined which straddles the maritime delimitation 
line and extends 30.5nm on either side of it, from the 20ºN parallel of latitude to the 
closing line of the Gulf.25 Additionally, a transitional arrangement zone north of 20ºN 
was established where the parties aim to gradually reduce the number of fishing vessels 
                                                          
17
  Charney and Alexander, International Maritime Boundaries, 1757. 
18
  Agreement between the Government of the Kingdom of Denmark together with the Home Government 
of the Faroe Islands on the one hand and the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and 
Northern Ireland on the other hand relating to the Maritime Delimitation in the area between the 
Faroe Islands and the United Kingdom, 18 May 1999 (entered into force 21 July 1999) Treaty text 
available at <www.un.org/Depts/los/LEGISLATIONANDTREATIES/PDFFILES/TREATIES/DNK-
GBR1999MD.PDF>. See also Charney, J.I. and Smith, R.W.  (2002) (eds.), International Maritime 
Boundaries, Vol. IV (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff), 2955-2977. 
19
  Ibid. 
20
  Ibid.: 2959-2960. 
21
  Denmark-UK Agreement, Article 5. 
22
  Ibid., Article 6. 
23
  Ibid.: Article 7. 
24
  Agreement between the People’s Republic of China and the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam on the 
Delimitation of the Territorial Sea, the Exclusive Economic Zone and Continental Shelf in Beibu 
Bay/Gulf of Tonkin (25 December 2000) and Agreement between the People’s Republic of China and 
the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam on Fisheries Cooperation for the Gulf of Tonkin.  For treaty text, 
see <www.un.org/Depts/los/legislationandtreaties.htm>. See also Colson, D.A. and Smith, R.W. (2005) 
(eds) International Maritime Boundaries, Vol. V (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff), 3745-3758. 
25
  Keyuan, Z., “The Sino-Vietnamese Agreement on Maritime Boundary Delimitation in the Gulf of 
Tonkin”, Ocean Development and International Law, 36 (2005): 13-24, at 16. 
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operating. A buffer zone either side of the parties’ territorial sea boundary in the 
immediate vicinity of the terminus of the land boundary on the coast in the north of the 
Gulf was defined in order to minimise disputes involving for small fishing vessels that 
may have trespassed across the boundary line.26 While the setting of fishing quotas and 
the number of fishing vessels allowed in the Common Fishery Zone is established jointly 
through a Joint Fisheries Committee, it is important to note that enforcement is on a 
conducted on the basis of coastal State authority, that is, on the basis of which side of 




3.2 Joint development agreements in lieu of a boundary agreement 
 
Cambodia-Vietnam 
Cambodia and Vietnam reached agreement in 1982 on the establishment of a joint area 
of “historic waters” in the Gulf of Thailand.27 The primary purpose of the agreement was 
the resolution of the parties’ dispute over several islands, sovereignty over which had 
previously been contested. Rather than reflecting the area of overlapping claims, 
therefore, the oblong-shaped joint historic waters area created through the 1982 
agreement is instead framed by, but does not include, the formerly disputed islands.  
 
The joint historic waters area extends seawards from the mainland coastlines of the two 
countries out to the vicinity of the Poulo Wei group of islands, which were specified as 
Cambodian, and the Tho Chu (Poulo Panjang) islands which according to the agreement 
were determined to be Vietnamese, as was the large island of Phu Quoc. No maritime 
boundary was defined through the joint area, though it was stated that negotiations on 
this issue would take place “at a suitable time.”28 Additionally, the agreement served to 
integrate Cambodia and Vietnam’s straight baseline systems which meet at “Point O”, 
whose precise location is unspecified, on the south-western limit of the historic waters 
area.29  
 
While not a joint arrangement overtly targeted at the cooperative development or 
management of marine resources or activities, the agreement does include some 
maritime joint development provisions. For example, Cambodia and Vietnam undertook 
to undertake the exploitation of natural resources within the joint historic waters area 
on the basis of “common agreement”, and to carry out joint surveillance and patrols in 
the joint area.30 The fishing activities of both parties were specified as being set to 
continue within the joint historic waters area “according to the habits that have existed 
so far.” Cambodia and Vietnam’s claim to the establishment of this unconventional joint 
historic waters area, and to joining their respective straight baseline systems at an 
                                                          
26
  Ibid.: 3749. See also, Thao, N.H., “Maritime Delimitation and Fishery Cooperation in the Tonkin Gulf”, 
Ocean Development and International Law, 36 (2005): 25-44. 
27
  Agreement on Historic Waters of Vietnam and Kampuchea, 7 July 1982 (entered into force 7 July 
1982). See, Charney, J.I. and Alexander, L.M. (1998) (eds), International Maritime Boundaries, Vol.III 
(Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff), 2364-2365.  
28
  Agreement on Historic Waters of Vietnam and Kampuchea, Article 2. 
29
  Ibid., Article 3. 
30
  Ibid. 
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apparently ‘floating’ point out to sea proved controversial and resulted in international 
protests, notably from Thailand31 and the United States.32 
 
Japan–Korea 
Although Japan and the Republic of Korea were able to delimit a maritime boundary 
between their respective territories in the southern part of the Sea of Japan (East Sea to 
Korea) and through the Korea Strait,33 they adopted radically different positions on the 
applicable principles and methods of delimitation applicable to the southern part of their 
potential continental shelf boundary extending into the East China Sea. On the one hand, 
Japan favoured delimitation on the basis of an equidistance or median line. On the other, 
Korea asserted that the boundary line should be influenced by geophysical factors on the 
basis of natural prolongation arguments. These contrasting approaches resulted in a broad 
area of overlapping maritime claims.34 
 
In order to overcome the deadlock in maritime boundary delimitation negotiations, in 
1974 Japan and Korea reached agreement on joint development with respect to the broad 
area (29,092 nm²) encompassed by their overlapping claims to maritime jurisdiction in 
the East China Sea.35 The Japan-Korea joint development zone shelved the issue of 
boundary delimitation36 and is designed to facilitate the exploration for and exploitation of 
seabed oil and gas resources over a 50 year period although, to date, without success.37 
The joint zone is divided into sub-zones (originally nine, subsequently reduced to six) 
and innovatively side-stepped concerns over the application of laws and regulations 
                                                          
31
  Thailand protested against the agreement in a note to the UN Secretary General dated 9 December 
1985. See, United Nations Law of the Sea Bulletin, 7 (April 1986): 111. 
32
  In a note to the UN Secretary General dated 17 June 1987, the United States government protested 
against the Cambodian-Vietnamese agreement, stating that the claim was made known internationally 
“less than five years ago” and that as a result there was “insufficient” evidence to demonstrate the 
required effective exercise of authority for such a historic claim. Additionally, the US note stated that 
“the United States has not acquiesced in this claim, nor can the community of States be said to have 
done so.” See, United Nations Law of the Sea Bulletin, 10 (November 1987): 23. See also Roach, J.A. 
and Smith, R.W. (1996) United States Responses to Excessive Maritime Claims, 2nd edition (The 
Hague: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers): 39-40; and Schofield, C.H. and Tan-Mullins, M. (2008) ‘Claims, 
Conflicts and Cooperation in the Gulf of Thailand’, Ocean Yearbook, 22, (Leiden/Boston: Martinus 
Nijhoff): 91-92. 
33
  Agreement between Japan and the Republic of Korea Concerning the Establishment of Boundary in the 
Northern Part of the Continental Shelf Adjacent to the Two Countries, 30 January 1974 (entered into 
force 22 June 1978). Treaty text available at 
<http://www.un.org/Depts/los/LEGISLATIONANDTREATIES/PDFFILES/TREATIES/jap-
kor1974north.tif>. See also Charney and Alexander, International Maritime Boundaries, 1057-1089. 
34
  The parties dispute over sovereignty concerning the islands of Dok-do (to Korea) or Takeshima (to 
Japan) also frustrated progress towards the delimitation of a maritime boundary further north. 
35
  Agreement between Japan and the Republic of Korea Concerning Joint Development of the Southern 
Part of the Continental Shelf Adjacent to the Two Countries, 30 January 1974 (entered into force 22 




  Article 28 of the Japan-Korea treaty states that: “Nothing in the Agreement shall be regarded as 
determining the question of sovereign rights over all or any portion of the Joint Development Zone or as 
prejudicing the positions of the respective Parties with respect to the delimitation of the continental shelf.” 
37
  Noting that the agreement entered into force in 1978. The agreement may be extended if no maritime 
boundary is delimited, although it can be terminated by either side with three years’ notice (Japan-
Korea treaty, Article 31(2)). 
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within each sub-zone by establishing an ‘operator formula’ approach.38 The costs 
incurred by the parties in the exploration and exploitation phases are to be shared equally 
between the concessionaires of the two countries, as are the proceeds from the natural 
resources extracted in a sub-zone. The parties also established a Joint Commission39 in 
order to facilitate liaison between the governments concerned, though they stopped short 
of setting up a more powerful joint authority. Had Japan and Korea in fact discovered oil 
and gas within the joint zone, a potentially major additional complication and disincentive 
to development is the fact that a third party, China, also claims parts of the joint zone and 
has refused to recognise its creation.40 
 
Saudi Arabia–Sudan 
The joint zone defined between the Saudi Arabia and Sudan in 197441 stands apart from 
other maritime joint development zones as its area of application is not defined by a 
series of geographic coordinates joined by lines, nor by the overlap in competing 
maritime claims. Instead, the joint zone applies to that part of the central part of the Red 
Sea between the two countries respective coasts which is greater than 1,000 metres in 
depth. The northern and southern limits of the joint zone have not, however, been 
defined. Although the agreement covers all natural resources, its primary objective was 
to allow for the joint exploration for and exploitation of the seabed mineral resources, 
notably metalliferous sediments rich in heavy metal such as copper, manganese, zinc, 
iron and silver, known to exist in the Red Sea deeps, especially off Sudan.42 Although a 
Saudi-Sudanese Red Sea Commission was established in 1975, it is understood that little 
exploration activity has in fact taken place and no commercial discoveries or 
developments have eventuated.43  
 
Australia–Indonesia 
Australia’s seabed boundaries with Indonesia in the Timor Sea of 1972 were negotiated 
prior to Indonesia’s 1975 occupation and subsequent annexation of East Timor, creating 
a discontinuity in the line which became commonly referred to as the ‘Timor Gap’. 
Following Indonesia’s invasion of East Timor and Canberra’s subsequent acceptance of 
Indonesian sovereignty over East Timor, boundary negotiations for the Timor Gap were 
initiated in order to join up the separate sections of their existing maritime boundary 
agreements to the east and west. However, largely as a consequence of evolutions in the 
international law of ocean boundary making, Indonesia refused to simply ‘close the gap’ 
on the same basis as its earlier agreements with Australia. As a result no boundary 
                                                          
38
 That is, within each sub-zone, concessionaires, authorised by the each of the parties, have an undivided 
interest and one operator is chosen from among the two concessionaires to conduct activities in a particular 
sub-zone. Thus, Japanese law applies to a Japanese operator within a particular sub-zone and Korean law 
similarly applies to a Korean operator within another sub-zone. See Article 19 of the Japan-Korea treaty. 
39
  Ibid., Article 24. 
40
  Charney and Alexander, International Maritime Boundaries, 1058. 
41
  Agreement Relating to the Joint Exploration of the Natural Resources of the Seabed and Subsoil of the 
Red Sea in the Common Zone, 16 May 1974. 
42
  Prescott, J.R.V. and Schofield, C.H. (2005) The Maritime Political Boundaries of the World 
(Leiden/Boston: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers), 488. 
43
  Dzurek, D.J., Parting the Red Sea: Boundaries, Offshore Resources and Transit, Maritime Briefing, 3, 
2, (Durham: International Boundaries Research Unit, 2001): 16. 
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agreement could be reached regarding the Timor Gap which was, instead, filled with a 
joint development zone – the Timor Gap Zone of Cooperation.44  
 
The Timor Gap cooperative arrangement covers an area of 60,500km² and is in large 
part based on the overlapping claims of the parties. The joint zone was, however, 
divided into three sub-zones – a large central, ‘sovereignty neutral’, Zone A where 
revenues were to be shared on a 50:50 basis, and two smaller ‘national’ zones, Zone B to 
the south where sharing was on the ratio 90:10 in favour of Australia and a narrow 
Zone C, where the ratio was 90:10 in favour of Indonesia. 
 
The treaty itself was signed in December 1989 with additional detailed regulations 
being added in 1991, and was widely regarded as the most sophisticated and 
comprehensive maritime joint development zone in the world.45  The initial duration of 
the agreement was to be 40 years, to be followed by successive terms of 20 years. The 
Timor Gap Treaty is, however, no longer in force having been replaced by agreements 
concluded between Australia and East Timor (see below). 
 
Malaysia–Thailand 
Although Malaysia and Thailand were able to agree on the alignment of their territorial 
sea boundary without undue difficulty,46 they were only able to delimit their continental 
shelf boundary out to a point approximately 29nm offshore.47 Seaward of that point, a 
dispute over the validity of a small Thai island as a basepoint led to a roughly wedge-
shaped overlap in continental shelf claims. This overlap in maritime claims provided the 
basis for the Thai-Malaysian joint development area (JDA).  
 
The agreement on joint development between Thailand and Malaysia took a 
considerable time to reach fruition, however. Although a Memorandum of 
Understanding (MoU) was concluded between the two States in February 1979 that 
established broad principles for the joint development of “non-living-resources, in 
particular petroleum”,48 a further agreement to deal with complex issues such as the 
                                                          
44
  Treaty between Australia and the Republic of Indonesia on the Zone of Cooperation in an Area 
between the Indonesian Province of East Timor and Northern Australia, 11 December 1989. For treaty 
text, see <www.un.org/Depts/los/legislationandtreaties.htm>. See also, Charney and Alexander, 
International Maritime Boundaries, 1245-1328.   
45
  Indeed, the Timor Gap Treaty, which together with its annexed model production sharing agreement 
and Petroleum Mining Code runs to in excess of 100 pages. 
46
  Treaty between the Kingdom of Thailand and Malaysia Relating to the Delimitation of the Territorial 
Seas of the Two Countries, 24 October 1979 (entered into force 15 July 1982). Treaty text available at 
<www.un.org/Depts/los/LEGISLATIONANDTREATIES/PDFFILES/TREATIES/THA-
MYS1979TS.PDF>. See also, Charney and Alexander, International Maritime Boundaries, 1091-1098. 
47
  Memorandum of Understanding between the Kingdom of Thailand and Malaysia on Delimitation of the 
Continental Shelf Boundary between the Two Countries in the Gulf of Thailand, 24 October 1979 
(entered into force 15 July 1982). Treaty text available at 
<www.un.org/Depts/los/LEGISLATIONANDTREATIES/PDFFILES/TREATIES/THA-
MYS1979CS.PDF>. See also Charney and Alexander, International Maritime Boundaries,1099-1123. 
48
  Memorandum of Understanding between the Kingdom of Thailand and Malaysia on the Establishment 
of a Joint Authority for the Exploitation of the Resources of the Sea-Bed in a Defined Area of the 
Continental Shelf of the Two Countries in the Gulf of Thailand, done on 21 February 1979. Treaty text 
available at 
<http://www.un.org/Depts/los/LEGISLATIONANDTREATIES/PDFFILES/TREATIES/THA-
MYS1979CS.PDF>. See also, Charney and Alexander, 1993: 1107-1123. 
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detailed regulations to govern activities in the JDA and on the establishment of a Joint 
Authority was not signed until May 1990.49  
 
It is worth noting that Vietnam also claims the most seaward part of the Thai-Malaysian 
JDA. However, in the Thai-Vietnamese maritime boundary treaty of 7 August 1997 there 
exists a specific indication that the parties, together with Malaysia “shall enter into 
negotiations…in order to settle the tripartite overlapping continental shelf claim area.”50 




The agreement concluded by Malaysia and Vietnam in 1992 establishes a long, narrow 
“Defined Area” in the southeastern part of the Gulf of Thailand for the exploration for 
and exploitation of seabed petroleum deposits.52 The Defined Area corresponds with 
the two States’ overlapping claims to continental shelf and was prompted by oil 
discoveries made by Malaysian contractors within the disputed zone. The joint 
arrangement was established for 40 years, subject to reviews and extensions and with 
costs and benefits to be shared equally. The agreement offers a framework under which 
nominees of the two governments can enter into agreements for exploring and 
exploiting petroleum reserves once the area has been delimited. The joint mechanism is 
therefore a relatively straightforward commercial arrangement whereby each country’s 
rights are managed by their respective national oil companies (Petronas of Malaysia and 
PetroVietnam of Vietnam).53  
 
Colombia–Jamaica 
The 1993 Maritime Delimitation Treaty between Colombia and Jamaica54 established a 
“Joint Regime Area” (JRA) to the west of an agreed maritime boundary. The JRA was 
                                                          
49
  Agreement between the Government of Malaysia and the Government of the Kingdom of Thailand on 
the Constitution and Other Matters Relating to the Establishment of the Malaysia-Thailand Joint 
Authority. See Charney and Alexander, International Maritime Boundaries, 1111-1123. On the reasons 
for the long haiutus between the MoU and implementing agreement see, Schofield, C.H., “Unlocking 
the Seabed Resources of the Gulf of Thailand,” Contemporary Southeast Asia 29, no. 2 (August 2007): 
286-308, at 292-293; and, Schofield, C.H. and Tan-Mullins, M. (2008) ‘Claims, Conflicts and 
Cooperation in the Gulf of Thailand’, Ocean Yearbook, 22, (Leiden/Boston: Martinus Nijhoff): 75-116, 
at 108-111. 
50
  Agreement between the Government of the Kingdom of Thailand and the Government of the Socialist 
Republic of Vietnam on the Delimitation of the Maritime Boundaries between the Two Countries in the 
Gulf of Thailand, 9 August 1997 (entered into force 28 February 1998), Article 2. Treaty text available 
at <http://www.un.org/Depts/los/LEGISLATIONANDTREATIES/PDFFILES/TREATIES/THA-
VNM1997MB.PDF>. See also, Charney and Smith, International Maritime Boundaries, 2,692-2,694. 
51
  Schofield, ‘Unlocking the Seabed Resources of the Gulf of Thailand’, 300 and Schofield and Tan-
Mullins, ‘Claims, Conflicts and Cooperation’ 112-113. 
52
  Memorandum of Understanding between Malaysia and the Socialist Republic of Vietnam for the 
Exploration and Exploitation of Petroleum in a Defined Area of the Continental Shelf Involving the 
Two Countries was signed on 5 June 1992 and entered into force on 4 June 1993. See Charney and 
Alexander, International Maritime Boundaries, 2335–2344. 
53
  The two governments do, however, retain a right of veto with regard to any agreements their national 
oil companies might reach. In practical terms, as Petronas had already issued production-sharing 
contracts for the overlapping area, PetroVietnam agreed to a commercial arrangement whereby these 
existing contracts would remain valid and petroleum operations would be directly managed by Petronas. 
54
  The treaty was signed  on 12 November 1993 (entered into force 14 March 1994). Treaty text available 
at <www.un.org/Depts/los/LEGISLATIONANDTREATIES/PDFFILES/TREATIES/JAM-
COL1993MD.PDF>. See also Charney and Alexander, International Maritime Boundaries, 2179-2204. 
12 
 
defined as being a “zone of joint management, control, exploration and exploitation of 
the living and non-living resources…pending the determination of the jurisdictional 
limits of each Party.” Within this area, however, two 12 nm-radius areas around the 
Columbian Seranilla Bank and Bajo Nuevo Cays were excluded. The total area of the JRA 
is approximately 4,500 nm².55 Within the JRA the parties agreed that they could explore 
for and exploit the natural resources therein, whether living or non-living, establish and 
use artificial islands, installations and structures, conduct marine scientific research, 
and take action to protect and preserve the marine environment and conserve living 
resources.56 With regard to activities relating to the exploration and exploitation of non-
living resources, as well as those in respect of marine scientific research and on the 
protection and preservation of the marine environment, however, the parties are to 
carry out activities “on a joint basis” reached through agreement between them.57 
Colombia and Jamaica furthermore agreed that within the JRA each State would have 
jurisdiction over its own nationals and vessels flying its own flag and they agreed to 
adopt measures to ensure that the national and vessels of third States would comply 
with any regulations and measures the parties were to adopt.58 The parties also agreed 
to establish a Joint Commission to “elaborate the modalities for the implementation and 
carrying out of” activities within the JRA.59 
 
                                                          
55
  Charney and Alexander, International Maritime Boundaries, 2181. 
56
  Colombia-Jamaica Treaty, Article 3(2).  
57
  Ibid., Article 3(3). 
58
  Ibid., Article 3(5 and 6) 
59




Despite the long-standing sovereignty dispute between Argentina and the United 
Kingdom (UK) over the Falkland Islands (Islas Malvinas to Argentina), South Georgia 
and the South Sandwich Islands, the parties have, following their 1982 conflict, sought 
to improve bilateral relations and this has yielded some maritime cooperative 
initiatives in the South Atlantic. On 2 November 1990 the two countries issued a Joint 
Statement on the Conservation of Fisheries,60 established a South Atlantic Fisheries 
Commission, and announced the cooperation of the two governments over the 
conservation of fish stocks between 45º and 60º south. Additionally, on 27 September 
1995 Argentina and the UK issued a Joint Declaration on Cooperation over Offshore 
Activities in the South West Atlantic.61 The Joint Declaration, “coordinated activities” in 
relation to a “sedimentary structure” in a defined to the southwest of the disputed 
islands within which the two governments would cooperate to encourage the 
exploration and production of hydrocarbons. The area in question has an area of 
approximately 20,000km2 (around 5,831nm2). Unfortunately, although these joint 
arrangements still exist in principle, at the time of writing bilateral relations had 
deteriorated markedly and no active cooperation was taking place. 
 
Nigeria–São Tomé and Príncipe 
Nigeria and Sao Tomé and Príncipe concluded a treaty in 2001 establishing a joint zone 
between them.62 The joint zone is the largest such arrangement established to date with 
an area of 34,540km2 (around 10,070nm2). The geographical scope of the joint zone in 
large part reflects the parties overlapping claims – the zones northwestern limit being 
based on an equidistance line between opposite coasts, its northeastern limit being 
defined by an equidistance line with neighbouring Equatorial Guinea, its southwestern 
limit by 200nm arcs from Nigeria while the southeastern limit approximately reflects a 
one-third effect line for Sao Tomé and Príncipe versus Nigeria.63 The objective of the 
joint arrangement is to exploit and share the natural resources of the joint zone, 
especially seabed hydrocarbons. Revenues to be derived from the exploitation of the 
resources within the joint zone are to be shared on the basis of 60 per cent to Nigeria 
and 40 per cent to Sao Tomé and Príncipe.64 The agreement establishes a Joint 
Ministerial Council and a Joint Authority (since renamed the Joint Development 
Authority or JDA).  
 
                                                          
60
  See, Churchill, R.R., “Falkland Islands – Maritime Jurisdiction and Cooperative Arrangements with 
Argentina”, Current Legal Developments, International and Comparative Law Quarterly, 46 (1997): 
463-477, at 463-467. 
61
  Ibid.: 468-471. 
62
  Treaty between the Federal Republic of Nigeria and the Democratic Republic of Sao Tomé and 
Príncipe on the Joint Development of Petroleum and other Resources, in Respect of Areas of the 
Exclusive Economic Zone of the Two States, 21 February 2001 (entered into force 16 January 2003), 
Article 4.  For treaty text see: <www.un.org/Depts/los/legislationandtreaties.htm>. See also, Colson 
and Smith, International Maritime Boundaries, 3638-3682. 
63
  Nigeria had earlier claimed a nil effect line for Sao Tomé and Príncipe but negotiations appear to have 
led to some moderation of this position. 
64
  Nigeria-Sao Tomé and Príncipe Treaty, Articles 3 and 18 and Colson and Smith, International 
Maritime Boundaries,3638. See also, Groves, H., “Offshore Oil and Gas Resources: Economics, 
Politics and the Rule of Law in the Nigeria-Sao Tomé e Príncipe Joint Development Zone”, Journal of 
International Affairs 59, 1 (Fall/Winter 2005): 81-96. 
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Australia–Timor Leste (East Timor) in the Timor Sea 
Prior to achieving independence, the East Timorese government in waiting, together 
with the United Nations Transitional Authority for East Timor (UNTAET) had made it 
clear that East Timor would not be bound by any of the agreements related to East 
Timor’s territory entered into by Jakarta – including the Timor Gap joint development 
zone mentioned above. In order to safeguard ongoing seabed resource developments in 
the Timor Sea, a new agreement, Timor Sea Treaty (TST) was signed between Australia 
and East Timor on the day that East Timor became independent.65 The TST established 
a Joint Petroleum Development Area (JPDA), which coincides with the central part of 
the old Australia-Indonesia joint zone (Zone A). Whereas in the past revenues from 
Zone A had been shared between Australia and Indonesia on an equal basis, under the 
TST revenues from seabed resources exploited within the JPDA are split 90:10 in East 
Timor’s favour.  
 
Complications then arose, especially in relation to the Greater Sunrise complex of fields 
straddling the northeastern limit of the JPDA.66 Unitization agreements between 
Australia and East Timor were signed but East Timor opted to delay ratification.67 It 
became clear that according to the unitization agreements that 20.1 per cent of Greater 
Sunrise lies within the JPDA with the remaining 79.9 per cent falling on what Australia 
regards as its side of the line. Consequently, East Timor was set to benefit from only 
marginally over 18 per cent of the proceeds from Greater Sunrise (90 per cent share of 
the 20.1 per cent of the field falling within the JPDA). East Timor subsequently argued 
that it was not bound by the dimensions of the ‘Timor Gap’ defined by previous 
Australia-Indonesia boundary agreements and claimed areas adjacent to the JPDA. The 
delimitation negotiations that ensued proved complex and contentious.68 
 
Ultimately, however, Australia and East Timor were able to overcome the barriers to 
agreement and the Treaty on Certain Maritime Arrangements in the Timor Sea (CMATS) 
was signed in 2006. 69 The treaty establishes a further interim resource sharing 
                                                          
65




  C.H. Schofield, ‘Dividing the Resources of the Timor Sea: A Matter of Life and Death for East Timor’, 
Contemporary Southeast Asia, 27(2) (August 2005), 255-280. 
67
  This agreement is often referred to as the Greater Sunrise International Unitisation Agreement, or 
Sunrise IUA. Memorandum of Understanding between the Government of the Democratic Republic of 
East Timor and the Government of Australia concerning an International Unitization Agreement for 
the Greater Sunrise field, Dili, 20 May 2002. Source: UN , 
<www.un.org/Depts/los/LEGISLATIONANDTREATIES/PDFFILES/TREATIES/AUS-
TLS2002SUN.PDF>, and, Agreement between the Government of Australia and the Government of the 
Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste relating to the Unitization of the Sunrise and Troubadour fields, 




  See, for example, Schofield, C.H. (2007) ‘Minding the Gap: The Australia – East Timor Treaty on 
Certain Maritime Arrangements in the Timor Sea’, International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law, 
Volume 22, No.2: 189-234. 
69
  CMATS was signed by Australian Foreign Minister Alexander Downer and East Timor’s then Minister 
for Foreign Affairs and Cooperation, Dr José Ramos-Horta, in the presence of their respective Prime 
Ministers, John Howard and Mari Alkatiri. See, Transcript of the Prime Minister, the Hon John 
Howard, MP, Joint Press Conference, Philip Street, Sydney, 12 January 2006 
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agreement whose area of application is coincident with the ‘Unit Area’ defined in the 
previously negotiated unitization agreement and therefore encompasses the Greater 
Sunrise complex of fields. The agreement provides for the equal sharing of revenues 
deriving from the upstream exploitation of petroleum resources within this zone.70 The 
CMATS is without prejudice to either side’s claims to maritime delimitation71 and 
includes stringent requirements for a moratorium on claims while the treaty is in 
force.72 The parties agreed to defer their claims to maritime jurisdiction and boundaries 
in the Timor Sea for up to 50 years.73 The treaty will, however, lapse if either a 
development plan for Greater Sunrise has not been approved within six years or 
production has not started within 10 years from the agreement entering into force.74 In 
this context it is worth noting that downstream activities can also lead to further 
contention and disputes have arisen between the parties with respect to the destination 
of any pipeline onshore and thus location of downstream processing infrastructure. 
CMATS also provides for East Timorese jurisdiction over the water column above the 
JPDA75 and serves to establish a bilateral joint Maritime Commission to ‘constitute a 
focal point for bilateral consultations with regard to maritime matters of interest to the 
Parties.’76 
 
Joint fishing zones in East Asia 
Three joint fisheries agreements, which emerged following the ratification of LOSC, 
declaration of EEZs by China, Japan and the Republic of Korea and resulting overlapping 
maritime claims, may be considered together. The agreements in question are: the 
China-Japan agreement of 11 November 1997 relating to part of the East China Sea; the 
Japan-Korea agreement of January 2000 in respect of parts of both the East China Sea 
and Sea of Japan (East Sea to Korea); and, the China-Korea of 30 June 2001 dealing with 
parts of the Yellow Sea.77 These joint agreements cover only part of China, Korea and 
Japan’s substantial areas of overlapping maritime claims. They are of a provisional 
nature and are without prejudice to final maritime boundary delimitation. These joint 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
<www.pm.gov.au/news/interviews/Interview1744.html>. For a copy of the treaty text see: 
<www.laohamutuk.org/Oil/Boundary/CMATS per cent20text.htm>; or, Schofield, ‘Minding the Gap’. 
70
  Consequently, rather than an 18.1 per cent share in Greater Sunrise as would have been the case under 
the earlier accords, East Timor stands to gain a full 50 per cent share in the revenues deriving from the 
development of those fields..  
71
  CMATS, Article 2. 
72
  The parties are restricted from the direct or indirect initiation of, or participation in, any proceedings 
relating to maritime boundary delimitation in the Timor Sea before ‘any court, tribunal or other dispute 
resolution mechanism’ or even raising such issues in ‘any international organisation’. CMATS, Article 
4. 
73
  Or, ‘until the date five years after the exploitation’ of the area covered by the treaty ceases, ‘whichever 
occurs earlier’ CMATS, Article 12. 
74
  CMATS, Article 12. 
75
  CMATS, Article 8 refers to a line which is defined by means of a list of coordinates of latitude and 
longitude, referred to World Geodetic System 84 and joined by geodesic lines, contained in a treaty 
Annex. The line so defined is consistent with the southern boundary of the JPDA with Australia to 
exercise jurisdiction to the south and East Timor to the north. 
76
  CMATS, Article 9. For a more in depth analysis of the CMATS Treaty see, Schofield, C.H., “Minding 
the Gap: The Australia – East Timor Treaty on Certain Maritime Arrangements in the Timor Sea”, 
International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law, 22, 2 (2007): 189-234. 
77
  The China – Japan agreement was signed on 11 November 1997 and entered into force on 1 June 2000; 
the South Korea – Japan agreement entered into force in January 1999; and the China – South Korea 
agreement entered into force on 30 June 2001. See S.P. Kim, ‘The UN Convention on the Law of the 
Sea and New Fisheries Agreements in North East Asia’, Marine Policy, 27 (2003), 97-109. 
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arrangements have drawbacks, notably that they provide for enforcement on a flag 
State basis with minimal joint enforcement envisaged and include no provisions for 
enforcement against third parties (such as, for example, Taiwan which is a significant 
fishing entity in the waters concerned). Furthermore, they encompass only part of the 
picture and substantial “current fishing patterns” zones where fishing is at the least 
uncoordinated and at the worst, largely unregulated. Nonetheless, they represent a 
positive step towards cooperative, joint solutions to shared problems and a potentially 
useful application of maritime joint development, frequently focussed on seabed 
hydrocarbons, concepts to living resources.78 
 
Cambodia – Thailand 
On 18 June 2001, Cambodia and Thailand signed a Memorandum of Understanding 
regarding the Area of their Overlapping Claims to the Continental Shelf in the Gulf of 
Thailand.79 The area covered by the MoU appears to coincide with the parties’ large 
overlapping claims area – an area believed to be highly prospective with respect to 
seabed hydrocarbon resources.80 Cambodia and Thailand have been engaged in 
negotiations over this area of overlap since the early 1990s without realising an 
agreement. Indeed, the MoU signed in 2001 has been aptly described as merely “an 
agreement-to-agree.”81 It does, however, mark potentially significant progress as it 
separates delimitation of a lateral maritime boundary in the vicinity of the terminus of 
the land boundary on the coast in the north, from joint development of the area of 
overlapping claims towards the centre of the Gulf, south of the 11° north parallel of 
latitude. The negotiations towards delimitation and joint development are to be 
conducted “simultaneously” and represent “an indivisible package.”82 Although the MoU 
mentioned “accelerated negotiation”,83 no agreement has yet been realized. Indeed, in 
2009 the Thai Government reportedly intended to unilaterally revoke the MOU,84 
although this does not appear to have formally occurred. Nonetheless, the conclusion of 
the MoU and the ensuing  negotiations must be considered a substantial positive step 
forward towards resolution of this longstanding maritime dispute.  
 
China – Japan  
                                                          
78
  See, Schofield, C.H. (2005) “Cooperative Mechanisms and Maritime Security in Areas of Overlapping 
Claims to Maritime Jurisdiction”, pp.99-115 in Cozens, P. and Mossop, J. (eds) Capacity Building for 
Maritime Security Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific, (Wellington: Centre for Strategic Studies: New 
Zealand). 
79
  Colson and Smith, International Maritime Boundaries, 3743–3744. 
80
  It can be inferred that the area of overlap between the parties has been reduced following the resolution 
of Cambodia and Vietnam’s sovereignty dispute over islands. Uncertainty does, however, persist in 
relation to the southern limit of the area covered by the MoU. See McDorman, T.L., “Maritime 
Boundary Delimitation in the Gulf of Thailand,” Hogaku Shimpo [The Chuo Law Review], CIX, no. 5-
6 (March 2003): 253-280, at 278-279. See also Schofield, 2007: 301-303 and Schofield and Tan-
Mullins, 2008: 113-115. 
81
  McDorman, ‘Maritime Boundary Delimitation in the Gulf of Thailand’, 277. 
82
  Cambodia-Thailand MoU, Article 2. 
83
  Ibid. 
84
  This was due in part to sporadic clashes along their land border in the vicinity of the Preah Vihear 
Temple as well as Cambodia’s appointment of ousted Thai Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra as an 
economic adviser.  
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It was reported on 16 June 2008 that China and Japan had reached “principled 
consensus” on cooperation in the East China Sea.85 The broad area of overlap between 
the parties’ claim in East China Sea results from their radically different views on the 
method of maritime delimitation to be applied – Japan basing its claim on equidistance 
and China on natural prolongation principles which would see a boundary line 
coincident with the Okinawa Trough, leaving much of the East China Sea on the Chinese 
side of the line. As a “first step” towards making the East China Sea a “sea of peace 
cooperation and friendship”, China and Japan agreed to joint development of a specified 
block of seabed. The joint area to be explored “under the principle of mutual benefit”, 
straddles the median line between the parties’ coasts and has an area of approximately 
2,700km2.86 Additionally, the two countries agreed to allow a Japanese corporation to 
invest in the Chinese entity already engaged in development activities in relation to the 
Chunxiao gas field (called the Shirakaba gas field by Japan), located on the Chinese side 
of but in close proximity to the theoretical median line. The June 2008 agreement makes 
it clear that cooperation will be entered into “in the transitional period prior to 
delimitation without prejudicing their respective legal positions.”87 Further negotiations 
were anticipated regarding converting this agreement in principle into a formal treaty 
and with regard to other disputed gas fields in close proximity to the median line in the 
East China Sea. Progress towards such a formal agreement on implementing the joint 
development arrangement has been slow, however.88 
 
 
4. Observations and Opportunities 
 
What commonalities and lessons can be gleaned from the above inventory and 
assessment of State practice in maritime joint development? Further, what does this 
practice suggest with respect to the potential application of maritime joint development 
in the South China Sea? 
 
With respect to joint zones defined in addition to maritime boundary agreements joint 
zones, the spatial dimensions of such joint arrangements are generally not confined or 
defined by the limits of overlapping maritime claims. The delimitation of a boundary 
line in essence appears to have freed negotiators of joint zones defined in conjunction 
with them of the limitations of national maritime claims. Concerning joint zones in lieu 
of boundary agreements, however, there is a much stronger tendency to define the 
dimensions of the joint zone according to the limits of areas of overlapping claims. As 
noted in the introduction to the paper, this is often a sensitive and challenging issue.  
 
The key reason why this is the case is that to accept a unilateral maritime claims as the 
limits of a joint area invests those unilateral claims with a degree of practical impact and 
thus legitimacy. This is particularly problematic where such unilateral maritime claims 
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  “China, Japan reach principled consensus on East China Sea issue”, Xinhua News Agency, 18 June 
2008 <www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2008-06/18/content_6774860.htm>. 
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  Ibid. See also, “Japan, China Agree on Investment, Joint Gas Project in E. China Sea”, Kyodo New 
Agency, 18 June 2008 <http://home.kyodo.co.jp/modules/fstStory/index.php?storyid=384582>.  
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  Ibid. 
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  See, for example, Schofield, C.H. and Townsend-Gault, I. (2011) ‘Choppy Waters Ahead in a “sea of 
peace, cooperation and friendship”?: Slow Progress Towards the Application of Maritime Joint 
Development to the East China Sea’, Marine Policy, Vol.35: 25-33. 
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are excessive in character. Indeed, if the scope of maritime joint development areas is to 
be defined on the basis of unilateral maritime claims, this provides a strong rationale for 
coastal States to advance maximalist and manifestly excessive claims to maritime 
jurisdiction. 
 
A notable example in this context is provided by the overlapping claims area between 
Cambodia and Thailand in the Gulf of Thailand. Cambodia’s lateral maritime claim is a 
clearly excessive one, proceeding from the terminus of the land boundary on the coast 
straight over a Thai island before proceeding to the central part of the Gulf.89 Given the 
excessive nature of Cambodia’s claim line, it was inconceivable that Thailand could 
accept it as the limit of a maritime joint development area. Thailand and Cambodia were 
able to side-step this issue in the negotiation of their 2001 MoU by separating the 
northern part of their overlapping area, where delimitation discussions would proceed, 
from the southern part of the overlap where joint development was the objective of 
negotiations.  
 
An analogous example, though not so extreme, is provided by the Thai-Malaysian 
experience in defining their joint development area, also in the Gulf of Thailand. As 
noted above, the key reason for an overlap in the maritime claims of the parties related 
to the status of a particular Thai offshore feature and its potential capacity to generate 
maritime claims and thus its role in maritime delimitation. Thailand claimed that the 
small islet in question, Ko Losin, is an island capable of generating continental shelf and 
exclusive economic zone rights and consequently represented a valid basepoint for 
maritime delimitation with Malaysia. Malaysia in contrast argued that Ko Losin is no 
more than a “rock” within the meaning of LOSC Article 121(3) and as such is only 
capable of generating claims to a 12nm breadth territorial sea and contiguous zones.90 
As Ko Losin is a mere 1.5 m (5 ft) high and steep-to all round it would seem that 
Malaysia had a point. Arguably this represents a case of Thailand seeking to maximise 
its maritime claims with a view to securing the best outcome, either in maritime 
delimitation negotiations or through widening the geographical scope of the area 
subject to joint development with the latter proving to be the outcome. 
 
These examples demonstrate how unilateral maritime claims, may not, in fact, 
necessarily provide an appropriate basis for the definition of a joint development zone. 
In this context it is also worth noting that States are under an obligation to formulate 
their maritime claims in “good faith” under both customary international law and 
LOSC.91 Further, maritime claims need to be clearly defined if they are to be used for 
this purpose.  
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  Cambodia’s 1972 continental shelf claim uses the Franco-Siamese Treaty of 23 March 1907 as a 
justification to define its claims in this manner. However, the 1907 treaty was concerned with the 
allocation of certain islands and territories and is predominantly concerned with the land boundary. 
However, in the 1907 Treaty referred to the use of the summit of Thailand’s Koh Kut island as a 
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90
  Charney and Alexander, International Maritime Boundaries, Vol. I, 1101. See also, Schofield and Tan-
Mullins, ‘Claims, Conflict and Cooperation’. 
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  See, LOSC Article 300. 
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It can also be remarked that an important purpose of establishing maritime joint 
development areas is to provide jurisdictional certainty and thus a sound basis for 
offshore resource development and management activities. In the case of the 
development of seabed hydrocarbons for instance, exploration and exploitation costs 
run in the billions of dollars and activities stretch over decades so providing a secure 
investment framework to international oil companies is crucial. In this context, the 
existence of a claim on the part of a third State to a bilaterally defined maritime 
cooperative arrangement can be regarded as a major complication. For example, as 
noted above, while Japan and Korea reached agreement on their joint zone, China 
objected. These objections had a direct bearing on US oil companies ceasing their 
operations in the joint zone. Similarly, in the Thai-Malaysian case, Vietnam’s claims to 
part of the Thai-Malaysian joint development area has led to no activities being 
undertaken within that part of the joint zone though there are prospects that a trilateral 
arrangement may emerge for this area. 
 
Arguably the key factors mentioned above that provide a basis for the spatial definition 
of maritime joint development zones are presently lacking in the South China Sea and 
this serves as a significant impediment to the definition of joint development zones 
therein. That is, a number of maritime jurisdictional claims are excessive in character 
and it is therefore questionable whether they have been made in good faith. Moreover, 
the basis and meaning of some of the claims made in the South China Sea, notably but 
not exclusively China’s ‘nine dashed line’ claim line, are vague and ill-defined. 
Consequently, maritime claims in the South China Sea have yet to be articulated in a 
clear enough fashion, as well as justified in international law, such that maritime joint 
development arrangements can be properly defined. Additionally, the multitude of 
overlapping maritime claims for which the South China Sea is renowned not only adds 
considerable complexity to the equation but raises ample potential concerns over third-
party claims that are likely to undermine efforts to enter into joint development 
arrangements on a bilateral basis.  
 
Taken together, these factors severely undermine the prospects for the definition of 
maritime joint development areas within the South China Sea generally. That said, hope 
of applying joint development arrangements to the South China Sea remain. It is notable, 
for example, that the South China Sea, and particularly its Gulf of Thailand extension, 
already hosts multiple joint development zones, especially towards its periphery. There 
may well be some scope for bilateral or trilateral joint development arrangements to be 
pursued in selected areas therefore. Equally, there may be scope for multilateral joint 
development arrangements to be defined once though the political will to achieve this 
would need to be considerable and there is little evidence of this existing at present. The 
clearer definition of claims to maritime jurisdiction and their definition in good faith in 
keeping with LOSC remain critical ingredients to the successful realisation of maritime 
joint development in the South China Sea.  
 
 
 
 
